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In recent years. Western literature contained a good deal about the 
shortcomings of/!ean6%e response — the official military doctrine of NATO. 
In the opinion of several authors, this doctrine is not suitable for exercis­
ing credible deterrence against the potential enemy. In fact, according to 
the doctrine, as it is known, in the event of an external attack. NATO would 
not immediately put into action its complete available nuclear arsenal, 
but would gradually react. In the event of an attack with conventional 
weapons, it would also defend itself with conventional weapons, but only 
as far as it is absolutely necessary in order to combat the attack. However, 
if it could not hold up the advance of the enemy in this way, at a certain 
point it would switch to the use of its nuclear arsenal. Initially, it would 
only use short-range nuclear artillery, but if that would prove to be insuffi­
cient, then it would launch medium-range or even intercontinental ballistic 
missiles — namely the complete nuclear capacity. According to the critics 
of flexible response this doctrine is unsuitable for credible deterrence, be­
cause the conventional forces of the Warsaw Treaty countries in Europe 
are in a superior position to NATO forces. They state that NATO would be 
unable to contain their attack with its own conventional forces, thus nucle­
ar weapons would sooner or later be put to use. However, after launching 
the first tactical missile, the Soviet Union would obviously launch its own 
missiles, which would most probably be answered by NATO using its me­
dium-range nuclear devices. In such a case, the operators of similar Soviet 
weapons would not remain idle, consequently an armed conflict between 
the conventional forces would extend with high grade automation into a 
genera! nuclear war. In such a conflict, the densely populated part of Wes­
tern Europe, laden with industrial plants, would completely perish. Thus, 
the announced threat that at a given point NATO would use its nuclear 
weapons does not have a deterring effect, because practically NATO would 
be threatening with suicide. The attacker would be justified to reckon with 
cold rationalism that its attack launched with conventional iorces would be 
successful, because it is in a superiority in the field of such weapons, and 
there is no realistic fear of a nuclear counter-strike. For example, Kissinger
says, " I t is absurd to base the strategy of the West on the credibility of 
mutual suicide". According to him, the West Europeans "should not keep 
asking us to multiply strategic assurance that we could not possibly mean 
or if we do mean, we should not want to execute because if we execute, we 
risk the destruction of the civilisation."^
According to its critics, the flexible response can be considered as a 
controversial doctrine also from another point of view. After all, it starts 
out from the unuttered presumption that а сои. & Uwded to
/VMro/x:. This follows from the stipulation of the doctrine that in the case 
of unsuccessful defence with conventional arms, NATO would not imme­
diately launch its available nuclear weapons, only to start with the short or 
medium-range nuclear missiles. Most probably this stipulation was formu­
lated with the presumption that the enemy — after a few "minor" exchan­
ges of nuclear strikes — will end its attacking operations. In other words, 
the elaborators of the doctrine regard it as imaginable that the conflict 
should not extend to other continents, and the area of the United States 
will not be reached by devastating nuclear attacks. It is interesting — the 
critics continue — that this presumption essentially tallies with the famous 
declaration of President Деяуям in October 1981, according to which, the 
possibility of a limited nuclear war in Europe is not infeasible. Although 
after a general outcry, this declaration was refuted by official sources, the 
analysis of the doctrine's internal logic reveals that it was far from an acci­
dental slip of the tongue.
Anders Лозег мр is correct when he says, "For doterrance to be credible, 
not rational political judgement, but insane vindictiveness or some unt­
hinking 'doomsday' device must be seen to be in control" . 2
At the time — certain experts pointed out — the deployment of Pers­
hing-2 missiles was explained to the Europeans with the necessity that the 
alliance of Western Europe and the United States has to be demonstrated 
to the enemy, namely, that a nuclear attack against Western Europe would 
obviously result in the launching of American nuclear weapons, and in 
this way, a total nuclear war between the two golbal powers. The source of 
the obvious contradiction between the two theses — according to the West 
German — should be sought in the difference of interests bet­
ween the Americans and the European NATO partners: while the United 
States' interests would require to keep a possible conflict within European 
boundaries, Western Europe's interest would be to make it credible for 
the Warsaw Treaty that the United States would immediately enter such 
a war. Obviously the two aims cannot be accomplished simultaneously.
Within consolidated international relations — Liibkeimer continues — 
for example, in the period of detente, when nobody felt the direct threat of 
war, [Western] genera! public opinion accepted nuclear deterrence as a 
legitimate strategic aim. In fact in such a period, it was not the question 
what would happen if the idea of deterrence would fail in a concrete case. 
However — as he writes — when the conflict-solving diplomatic and poli­
tical methods remain unsuccessful or not efficient enough, then military 
concepts concerning the avoidance of war, have a considerable greater
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significance. W hen peace is less dependent on political conditions and more 
on the deterrance effect o f  nuclear weapons, not only the enemy, hut soo­
ner or later the members o f the alliance will consider these weapons as 
dangerous. The more they have to  rely on nuclear weapons to  defend se­
curity. the smaller the credibility o f the nuclear deterrence — he states.^
A further contradiction connected with the doctrine o f flexib le res­
ponse concerns the e.scafntfon doHiiTMotce. This means that in a m ilitary con­
flict only one party possesses the capability to  cause an unacceptable da­
mage to the other party w ith its new (and further) escalation steps, w ithout 
the latter answering with comparable counter-measures. Practically, this 
capability is identical with military superiority. However, it is obvious that 
no escalation dominance exists in the relations o f the two global major 
powers, in fact the U nited States does not possess such a superiority. H o­
wever. the concept o f the gradual application o f more and more destructive  
weapons only seems to be a rational action if  it may promise some result. I f  
the aggressor has the capability o f escalation in the same manner as the  
defender, then escalation does not mean credible deterrence on either side.
Do we have to  take seriously the various quoted (and unquoted) cri­
tical statem ents? According to  A/weA' TAee concerning the arms race, "as 
never before in the history, contemporary military doctrines and strate­
gies are by  their nature intuitive and highly speculative, because o f the  
unremittant revolution in military technology and the im possibility o f real- 
life-testing o f the nuclear arsenal."'* Well, if  this is a speculative doctrine 
then its criticisms cannot be free o f sp ecu la tiv e  features either. Thus, we 
do not know whether the flexible response is credible and whether the  
concerned critical statem ents are justified or not.
O f course, the question will be decided whether the actual addressee, 
the Warsaw Treaty considers this military doctrine as credible. Nam ely — 
at least in theory — the important thing would not be what the elaborators 
of the doctrine think about their own concept, but what the adversary 
thinks about it. However, this is not easy to  ascertain. In a similar man­
ner, not one word can be found in any NATO documents about which doc­
trine they would apply if  in fact NATO would launch an attack against 
any country o f the Warsaw Treaty and in the same manner no experts o f  
the WTO have published lucubrations concerning a reverse case. B oth a l­
liances have declared a defensive doctrine and describes the other as the 
potential aggressor. However, being aware o f this, one should not ignore 
the fact that in the WTO — at least as far as I know — no such document 
or analysis was composed, which in any manner would doubt the credibi­
lity  o f the doctrine o f flexible response.
For example, according to László Tobiay in connection w ith the m ili­
tary doctrine o f the WTO, "The socialist countries adm it that a world war 
can be launched and for a tim e carried on with the use o f  conventional 
weapons, but the escalation o f military activities can lead to a transition  
into a general nuclear war, whose main aims are the nuclear, but primarily 
the strategic nuclear weapons."s Other signs also indicate that nobody 
doubts in the WTO that in the case o f a European conflict NATO would
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sooner or later use its nuclear weapons. For exam ple, in a contrary case 
the Soviet Union would not so strongly emphasize that NATO should also 
declare its  no first use policy. This is also indicated by the often expounded  
Soviet standpoint according to  which, no type o f  lim ited nuclear war can 
be imagined in the present sta te o f the developm ent o f weapons. Soviet 
experts are deeply convinced that any sporadic nuclear exchange in Europe 
would alm ost im m ediately turn into an overall nuclear war. One does not 
know what type o f information the American intelligence com m unity pro­
vides for the military leadership, nevertheless, no data were revealed from  
th is source which would indicate the Soviet or WTO doubts concerning 
flexible response, not even indirect references can be read concerning 
this.
AM Mrs ytve.s Me parh*cM%%r MMpreggioa us y  Me poJr'McMors uud /uMiMry 
caperM o/* Me NATO AuM.s u ouM Meurseirc-s rmdermMe Me cre&'MMy q/ Meir
r/AMYary dorMMe. As if  their aim would be to make the WTO leadership 
believe: i f  you attack us, we shall defend ourselves with conventional wea­
pons, and do not be afraid that we shall also use nuclear weapons, because 
we are not so serious about the nuclear option.
An Eastern European observer is somewhat puzzled by the particular 
lack o f NATO self-confidence (more precisely, by the lack of confidence 
concerning the credibility o f its own deterronce). Particularly if  he is som e­
what familiar w ith the E ast European concept concerning the state of 
the European theatre, the geo-political situation o f the WTO, the war, 
within this the nuclear war, and the possible solution o f the conflicts b et­
ween E ast and W est. I t  seems sim ply impossible tor the observer that the 
jxjlitical leadership o f the WTO — or o fth e  Soviet Union — would be ready 
to  undertake the astounding risk o f initiating an armed conflicht in Europe 
or to extend a conflict from another place to  Europe and with th is expose 
itse lf to the danger o f a nuclear strike. When evaluating the undertaking 
o f this risk, one should not ignore the fact that there is a dual risk: the  
attacking party has to presume that 1. w ith regard to conventional wapons 
it  has not only a theoretical or marginal superiority, but an overwhelming, 
decisive superiority over the other party, and it  can utilize its capabilities 
within a very short time, namely, it can cerMMly win a conventional 
war; 2. the attacked party does not dare to  use nuclear weapons although it 
would still have tim e and a physical possibility for this, and is aware o f the  
fact that in the case o f defeat the attacker would destroy its entire politi­
cal, economic and social system . I t  is an indisputable fact that the presump­
tions and perceptions are frequently faulty, and that a significant part o f  
the wars — including exactly the two world wars — were launched on the 
basis o f misperceptions. However, it is also a fact that part o f such wars 
did not mean a deadly danger either for the attacked party or — which is 
more important in th is case — for the attacker, as there were no nuclear 
w eapons; in another part o f the wars (for exam ple, in the two world wars) 
it  was only found much later that the perceptions are basically wrong and 
the short term analysis correctly sensed the existence o f the military supe­
riority.
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Of course, the question can be raised the other way round: do they be­
lieve in the W est that if  an attack is iaunched against the member states  
o f the WTO, the Soviet Union wou!d also hesitate to  use her nuclear wea­
pons i f  the attack could not be halted w ith conventional means? Of course, 
because o f the already mentioned reasons, such a question cannot appear 
in official documents and the official doctrine starts out from the apparent 
superiority o f the WTO w ith regard to conventional weapons, but in the  
strategic plans such and similar questions also have to  be answered som e­
where. And what is the content o f the answer? I  do not know, but I  believe 
that there is no doubt in the W est in the prospect o f using Soviet nuclear 
weapons in a situation when the existence o f the socialist countries is put 
at risk.
W ithout going more deeply into the question o f the European m ili­
tary balance, w ith  regard to  point 1. o f the previous paragraph, I would 
like to  indicate that in contrast to  the numerous W estern analyses published  
in the past decade, which illustrated a strong WTO superiority in the field  
o f  conventional forces, one can read an increasing number o f studies con­
taining different conclusions. According to  Mary EaMor.' "There now  
exists a rough conventional balance in Europe that has actually moved in 
NATO's favor over the last ten years" — adding that — "NATO has a 
numerical superiority in some categories o f m ilitary strength, such as the  
manpower, anti-tank weapons, and helicopters. . . The Warsaw P act has a 
superiority in others, including tanks, artillery and anti-aircraft weapons."^ 
John dfeans/ieMner says that, "NATO has strong conventional farces that 
stand a  yood chance o f thwarting a Soviet blitzkrieg."? "Although official 
comparisons o f NATO and Warsaw P act defence spending — states Barry 
Posen — have consistently shown NATO outsprending the P act by vary­
ing degrees. . . the tendency in both official and unofficial balance assess­
ments has been to highlight P act advantages in tanks, guns, planes, or 
divisions. The possibility that NATO's higher spending m ight be generating 
less visible, but equally important, elements o f military capability seldom  
receives much consideration. . . Since NATO outspends the Pact, but the  
P act 'out-invests' NATO, it follows that NATO outspends the P act in  
people, operations, training, maintenance, and the like." However, accor­
ding to  Posen, th is is more im portant and after all NATO has the capability  
to prevent a breakthrough by the WTO A W ell, if  th is is seen in th is way 
by Western analysts who otherwise are critical about the military policy  
of NATO in many respects, then there is v e iy  little  probability that the 
analysts o f the WTO should be overwhelmed by the proud feeling o f a 
considerable superiority.
Nevertheless, the NATO leadership developed a certain anxiety  con­
cerning the credibility o f European nuclear deterrence and from among 
the two possible alternatives o f the solution o f the problem — in m y opi­
nion — chose the less fortunate one. This alternative is the lowering o f  
nuclear threshold and the increase o f offensive war fighting capabilities. 
This appeared in the not officially, but practically closely linked doctrines 
termed Follow-On-Forces-Attack (FOFA) and AirLand Battle.
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The other possible alternative would have been the raising of nuclear 
threshold and the increase of the defensive capabilities, under the key­
words alternative security, defensive or non-provocative defence and so on. 
Regrettably the latter alternative, for the time being, is only supported 
by politicians in opposition, peace researchers and a few companies, inte­
rested in the production of defensive weapons.
The declaration of the FOFA and AirLand Hattie doctrines cause an­
xiety not only in the East, but also in a wide circle in the West. The FOFA 
was formally adopted by the Defence Planning Committee of NATO in 
November 1984 thus being considered the official battle doctrine. Although 
according to several declarations the AirLand Battle published in August 
1982 is only a doctrine valid for the US army, numerous evidence indicates 
that practically it would be applied in the European theatre." As it is known 
the essence of the doctrines is that in the case of an assumed attack by the 
Warsaw Treaty it is not satisfactory to attempt to halt the offensive forces 
on the frontiers, because in such a case the West would have to fight its de­
fensive war entirely on its own territory. Therefore, with various rowrCM- 
L*o?Md armed forces -  primarily with the use of non-nuclear shortrange 
missiles, precision-guided artillery weapons and unmanned aircraft — po­
werful strikes have to be made at the beginning of the conflict on the first 
echelons and then on the second, the third and so on. The aim is to cut the 
supply lines from the attacking echelons. For this end, they have to des­
troy airports, stores, railway lines, bridges, radar stations and communi­
cations equipment, etc., at a depth of 50 to 400 km on the enemy's terri­
tory. Then as quickly as possible they have to penetrate the enemy's ter­
ritory. According to the official American source*" "operations carried out 
on the basis of the AirLand Battle are quick, powerful and successfully 
utilize the shortcomings of the enemy. . . In a constantly changing situa­
tion, the attacking [NATO] forces keep the initiative in hand and destroy 
the unity of the enemy s defence. Applying the various supporting and re­
serve forces in a flexible manner, they continue the attack until they ac­
quire victory. . . Independently of whether they initially attack or defend 
themselves, the American units have to capture the initiative at any point 
of the globe and have to use this in an aggressive manner. . . Penetration 
deeply into the enemy's territory is not an unimportant or secondary opera­
tional task, but part of a co-ordinating operational plan which cannot be 
neglected." Up to now, the cited source exclusively spoke about operations 
with conventional armed forces. However, the following lines contain more: 
"The use of nuclear and chemical weapons dramatically increases the pos­
sibility to suddenly change the field situation which the attacker will be 
able to successfully utilize." Or somewhere else: "By extending the battle­
field and integrating conventional, nuclear, chemical and electronic 
means. . . the US Army can quickly begin offensive action to conclude the 
battle on its terms."** D.T. 7%.sr/; quotes General Starry. The former com­
mander of the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), and origina­
tor of the AirLand Battle told a Congressional committee in 1984 that in a 
Central European battle "the delays that are attendant upon asking for
252________ i.Aszi.6 VALKi
and receiving nuclear weapons release always create a situation in which if 
you wait for until they get into your territory to ask foi the use of nuclear 
weapons, it is always too late. . Plesch is justifiablystating that "¿Ac M.se 
o/ MMcJeur M'gapOK.s bi. Ab/vonZ i'.s /Acre/orc di/fcrcwt
/row /Ae oi/Aodo.r tiew r /  /Jcaa'6^ e rc.spomc. . . AirLand Battle appears to 
envisage a deliberate lowering of the nuclear threshold at a time when 
public concern has centered on the need to raise it."'^ However, in my in­
terpretation, the quoted doctrine not only lowers the nuclear threshold 
onto a lower level, but practically terminates it for in any type of European 
armed conflict it envisages the almost immediate use of weapons of mass 
destruction. This is a characteristic, dangerous concept as it considers nuc­
lear weapons identical with conventional ones, except that they are some­
what more destructive. Essentially this is described by Dieter <Seny/;/m.s 
as "die der rnddearew
Those who elaborated on this doctrine believe that the third world 
war could be conducted in a similar way to the second, although this could 
still be survived by the people of the continent, while survival of the next 
would be impossible.
A closely connected further problem is that a missile with a convention­
al warhead in its appearance is not different from a missile with a nuclear 
warhead.Only frequent on-site verification could decide what type of war­
head it is, however, obviously there is no opportunity of doing this. The 
situation is similar in the case of aircraft and artillery guns. Consequently, 
the military command of the W'ersaw Treaty forces — in a tense internatio­
nal situation — would not be aware of whether the deep penetration stipula­
ted in the AirLand Battle doctrine or in the FOFA will be executed with 
conventional or nuclear weapons. In such a case, the military command is 
obliged to prepare for the worse case, thus the danger of launching an unde­
sirable nuclear war increases.
I t should be noted that the AirLand Battle or the FOFA present a 
particular danger for the minor East European countries. A deep interdic­
tion — as it was shown — would involve an approximate 50 to 400 km 
zone, namely it would involve roughly the territory of exactly these count­
ries. Of course, if an armed conflict would immediately escalate into an 
overall nuclear war then it would be immaterial in which order the members 
of the WTO would be destroyed. But if, for some reason escalation would 
be halted, this could only happen after the deep interdiction, when, howe­
ver, irreparable damage has already been caused in the East European 
theatre. In other words, the gravest destruction would occur exactly in the 
minor countries situated at the borders of the two Europes, not to speak 
about the possible loss of territory. In this respect Piesr/i again quotes Ge­
neral Starry: "The outcome of the battle, we hope is that . . . the enemy 
assault echelon has been defeated, we have regained the initiative and 
po-s-s/M?/ .some <*/ /a'.<? /cmlory. . . We must create operational depth and we 
must do so on the enemy's side of the battle area." And Plesch adds: " I t 
seems therefore that attacks by ground ibices into Eastern Europe do form 
part of US Army preparation for a war in Central Europe."*' No wonder,
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that the experts of the concerned countries judge the mentioned doctrines 
in a particularly negative manner.
* * *
As I mentioned before, the materialization of the other alternative, 
the concept of de/enswe de/ence could eliminate the lack of nuclear self- 
assurance by NATO. This concept was elaborated by West German peace 
researchers a few years ago and since then it became known in a relatively 
broad circle — thus I can omit its representation (although I consider it 
practical to summarize its essence in the Annex).*"
The West German peace researchers suggest the elaboration of a de­
fensive system for NATO, which is very effective, would prevent an attack 
launched with any type of conventional forces and at the same time, would 
not incorporate any type of threats to the countries of the Warsaw Treaty. 
No front lines, such as the defence system of the Maginot Line would 
be erected, because they can easily be broken through in a "Blitzkrieg". 
Instead, four defensive zones would be created along the border dividing 
the two military alliances.
The supporters of defensive defence expect a favourable political ef­
fect from the accomplishment of this concept. In their opinion, primarily 
mutual understanding and trust would increase between the countries 
of the two military alliances, which would also enable the conclusion of a 
number of other arms limitation agreements. For example, an agreement 
could be reached at the Vienna MHFR negotiations, which have been car­
ried out without any success for the past ten years; or at the Geneva ne­
gotiations, and the first use of nuclear weapons could be ruled out in a bi­
lateral or multilateral agreement, the sale of arms to the Third World 
could be regulated and so on.
At the beginning peace researchers suggested that NATO should M?M- 
/n/emMy introduce the system of defensive defence. They were not expec­
ting similar measures on the part the WTO countries.*" Now nobody talks 
about unilateral measures any more and that is correct: if the new system 
would be introduced some time, then i/ rrd/Aaw/oAe iM/rod?;wd Ay /Ac 1FTG 
coM?dries ns we/J.
What arguments can be mentioned pro and contra the concept? First, 
I list the arguments frr /nvonr of it.
1. TAe reyec/ro% o/ /Ac principle o/ de/cKcc, /Ac rep/ace;Me%/ o/
/Ac nyyressft-e doc/r/Mes Gnwn ns /Ac FOFd nnd /Ac At'cAnMd Rn/Z/e Ay na- 
o/Aer Jes.s daMyeroMg concept mny MndonA/ed/y con/r/AM/e /o /Ae co?Mo/ida/;oH 
Enropenn secardy and /o rncrenswy /rn.s/ Ac/?eeen /Ac conn/r/es o/ /Ae /?ro 
mdi/nry oJA/onces. If NATO would genuinely stop the development of its 
offensive forces in the West European — primarily West German -  area, if 
it would withdraw and then would let its heavy armoured units become
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outdated, if it wou!d make itself physically unable to carry out any massive 
attacking military operations — this would obviously have a favourable 
efiect on the relationship between the two Europes. Such a series of steps 
would be an important indication for the socialist countries, because it 
would be embodied not only in announcements of positive note, but also in 
material changes.
2. Further progress of offensive military technologies can lead 
to the development of such /Mr/Aer .sy.s/ew.s o/* ireapoMN, which can de- 
-s/aMixe European power relations. If in the future, efforts in the NATO 
countries will be directed onto the development of the defensive and not on 
the offensive capabilities, this would obviously have a rather positive ef­
fect.
3. I t  could have a favourable efiect on the policy of NATO as an orga­
nization, if discussions within the organization in the future years would 
not exclusively cover the ratio to which the military budget should be 
increased or how deep the interdiction should be into the area of the War­
saw Treatv countries in case of a military conflict. An interchange of ideas 
about the possibilities of defensive defence would provide the opportunity 
/o approucA /Ac s/ra/eyt'c and /ac/fcal proMew-s /ro?a a coiaple/cly d^/erea/ 
aaylc, and to re-evaluate a number of theses, which since the halting of 
detente were handled in NATO as indisputable truth. I t  could also have a 
positive effect on the atmosphere within the organization if the Was/ 
A'aropeaa wemAer cona/ries a-onld repeatedly eapce-ss /Ae;'r differ wy .s/ra/eyfe 
Mi/ere-sAs/roiM /Ao.se o/' /Ae A/aded ¿?/a/e.s. Only such and similar ideas could 
make it clear to the military and political elite of the United States that 
geographical differences and dissimilarities in historic development may 
demand a different military doctrine (and foreign policy) in Europe. The 
debate about the concept of defensive defence, which recently emerges 
with the participation of peace researchers and strategic experts, indicates 
the strengthening conviction in Western Europe: the present leadership 
of the United States should re-evaluate its general foreign political and mi­
litary concepts.
4. Another argument appears in the Western literature, namely, that 
the setting up of a highly effective defensive defence system would reassure 
all those who, for this or that reason, regard the present conventional de­
fence system of NATO as /rayi'le and believe that because of this the mili­
tary leaders would make hasty decisions about launching nuclear weapons 
in an eventual crisis. As defensive defence would be practically impenetrab­
le with conventional armed forces, the necessity of launching nuclear wea­
pons would not even emerge. Thus, the function of the latter would be essen­
tially narrower after building defensive defence: it would only serve the 
aim of deterring the enemy from a nuclear attack. Thus, the implementation 
of defensive defence could significantly contribute to the raising of the 
nuclear threshold and at the same time, to the increase in the chances of 
the survival of human existence.
/¿asere"/i'oa.s' with regard to the concept of defensive defence are the 
following:
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1. For the time being, the realization of the concept is oniy slightly
probable. Primarily, because the pre.sea/ cafwf/n'.s/m/forr -  which
has retained power for another term — cMrrfeg o?d .sacA M ybrefy/r nn/f- 
/ury po/:'cy, ?r:7A _a-AaA /Ae f&o q/de/en-sd-c de/e?:ce M mro/upa/i'AJe.
The administration, which despite the increasing disputes and controversial 
nature of the programme, consistently carries out the deployment of the 
Pershing-2s and cruise missiles, which introduces for its own use the expli­
citly offensive AirLand Hattie doctrine and makes the European member 
countries of NATO accept the almost corresponding Rogers Plan, will 
regard this concept as being basically contrary to its strategic outlook 
and aims, and will accordingly act against it. Thus, the question emerges 
whether during the next years, the conviction can be nurtured in the 
present American leadership that the concept of defensive defence serves 
the interest not only of NATO, but also ofthe United States. It also remains 
open how the West European member countries will opine about the 
concept; for it is far from certain that they will all agree with the idea of 
transarmament. Of course, not even the elaborators of the idea of defensive 
defence reckon with a rapid reaching of general accord, this is why they 
wish to launch an active propaganda campaign tor the cause in the co­
ming years.
2. 7A order /o dmreo.se accord and /r?os/ Aedceea /Ac coMrdrr'e.s o/ /Ac dco 
M'orld -s'/.s/e/H.s, A d ?'0 Arcs ?o do .so^ ae/rArd more /Aoa dr mu/*e ?'/.s de/e?me M??- 
penedrdde. While acknowledig the positive sides of defensive defence, one 
should not forget about the peculiar circumstance that the perfection of 
defensive technology and the increase of defensive capabilities Ml/fma/ed/ 
.s/rcMg/Acrr /Ac AU17'0 odr'aacc. and within this, the United States. The pre­
sent strategical balance between the two military alliances and their lea­
ding powers is not exclusively limited to Europe. A strategic balance is a 
global and complex phenomenon. Global in a sense that political and mili­
tary changes in any area of the earth affect it, thus, the different regions 
cannot be observed in a separate and independent manner from each other. 
Complex in a sense that it creates a united system, in which both offensive 
and defensive weapons can be found, as well as offensive and defensive 
strategic, operational and tactical doctrines. The fact that one of the for­
ces confronted in the European region is equipped with ro?n-<mdo?taJ de­
fensive weapons, may even increase the offensive abilities in the case of 
other weapon systems and/or other regions. The real threat for the War­
saw Treaty countries in Europe most probably does not primarily lie in 
the conventional NATO forces, but in the short and medium-range nuclear 
weapons, the Fcrshings, the cruise missiles and other nuclear weapons sta­
tioned in the forward based system. The described concept — as it could be 
seen only mentions them so far, that q/7er the change to defensive de­
fence most probably the arms limitation negotiations will continue. For 
the time being, even after setting up an ivubierable NATO defence, nuclear 
weapons would still exist in Western Europe (at best -  as the result of 
indepenoent decisions — the number of short-range missiles would be re­
duced to a considerable extent). To make defence invulnerable in the field
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of conventional weapons, where the position of the Warsaw Treaty forces 
is relatively favourable, might increase the fighting capabilities of nuclear 
weapons of NATO. Thus, the transarmament in the conventional sphere 
would only have a positive effect if similar measures would be taken in the 
nuclear sphere.
3. In this connection, the psychology of decision-making deserves 
mentioning. I think Kissinger said somewhere that in strategy it is not the 
existence of real marginal superiority which is decisive, but the ait'areneas 
or perception o/ .superiority. For in the possession of marginal superiority, it 
is risky to enter armed conflicts, because such a superiority can bring little 
result and all rational strategists are aware of this. Hut if politicians simply 
perceive superiority, on this basis they can make irrational decisions, which 
even endanger the security of the decision-makers themselves.
In our case, building up an invulnerable defence might bring about 
such dangers; in a critical situation, an American administration may feel 
that — with a perfectly défendable Western Europe in the background — 
it has a free hand on other continents.
4. None of the descriptions of the concept 1 know contains more de­
tailed hints at the /orcc.s around Europe. Defensive defence would
be exclusively developed on the mainland of Europe, although ior a long 
time now the submarines and aircraft carriers which patrol around the con­
tinent have been acquiring an increasing significance and would most pro­
bably play a role in an eventual European armed conflict.
5. Western literature also includes the reservation that the accomplish­
ment of defensive defence may make war with conventiona! weapons pos­
sible or imaginable. Until now — they say — none of the parties could 
ponder on aggressive plans in Europe, because it was clear that any type 
of attack would provoke a nuclear counter-blow from the other side; in 
other words, nuclear parity prevented all types of armed conflict in Europe. 
Nevertheless, if the transarmament can be accomplished, then some mili­
tary leaders may feel free to calculate the gains and losses of an attack with 
conventional forces, and may presume that capturing the initiative is a 
better tactic and that better commanding abilities, surprising manoeuvres 
and the political conviction of the troops, etc., can decide the result of 
the war in a favourable direction. One of the authors reminds readers that 
throughout history eveiy attacking party — including those who lost — 
almost without fail launched wars, trusting such factors. However, for the 
time being, this reservation does not seem topical, because — even if an 
agreement can be brought about sometime regarding the mutual disar­
mament of the European nuclear forces — the strategic muclear weapons 
will still exist on both sides, namely, the state of mutual nuclear deterrence 
will remain essantially unchanged.*?
The details of how defensive defence can be accomplished are still 
being elaborated in the West European peace research centres. Hungarian 
military experts have just started to study this concept from the side of the 
military sciences. Therefore, it would be too early to draw final conclusions 
from the already known ideas and presumptions; obviously, such conclu-
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sions can only be drawn after thorough examination. However, one thing 
seems to be certain : i? ts <7 cwtcep/ ?c/n'<"A peaces .so/ac ;'u /^e wfL'/ary
cn ?? /o ? ;/a /o f /Ac /ao oHfoHce .sy.s/ew.s ?'a/o o ?:e?c 1/y/;/, nar/ — compared to 
other recently published Western approaches — searches /or on.
)ao?e po.s;7n'c .sof?dfo?:. I t  deserves distinguished attention from the side of 
the WTO, and further careful study, even if its accomplishment faces ob­
vious obstacles. I t is also certain that the accomplishment of the idea of 
defensive defence alone would be far from sufficient to rekindle détente 
and to normalize relations bet ween the East and West. Thus, a change to 
defensive defence can only be imagined o.s par/ of a desired process of dé­
tente and not as its ¿m/fo/or.
Where would such a revived process of détente lead? Some political 
scientists outline a far sighted perspective. In their opinion, with the pas­
sage of time the loosening of the system of military blocs could be started; 
according to them the elimination of the bloc system is the result of a desir­
able process on the one hand, and on the other, it could be an important 
stage of a longer term historic process. There are some political writers, 
according to whom, the minor East and West European states could also 
be neutralized.
For example, Jochen Loser, a retired West German general, advocates 
a Central Europe in several of his writings in which the states could pre­
serve their social-political system, but would become neutral in the mili­
tary sense. Foreign troops would be withdrawn from these countries, and 
from that point onward these countries would look after their own defence, 
similarly to the way it is done in Switzerland. Austria or Yugoslavia. In 
his book, jointly written with Ulrike &7;t7L*My, Loser says: "Central Europe 
should not be'neutralist' and 'Finlandlized'. If the use of a term is at all 
necessary in order to define the objective, then it may better be Austria- 
lism' in the sense of an actively followed neutral policy, relying on state 
sovereignty. If the G.D.R., Poland, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and 
Czechoslovakia would step out from the alliance with the Soviet army 
— similarly to the F.R.G., from the integration with the NATO forces — 
the co-ordinational and control mechanisms of the alliances could be main­
tained as long as the Centra! European community, to be set up, will come 
into a situation to undertake their tasks.
Dieter /Scay/nms likes to use the expression "Finlandization" which by 
him means the unlimited internal autonomy' of the East European coun­
tries, in addition 'to the legally codified confirmation of the security re­
quirements of the neighbouring major power, and the continuation of a 
circumspect foreign policy relying on this." According to the West German 
peace researcher, "Finlandization" and the elimination of the blocs in 
Eastern Europe would contribute to the satisfaction of the Soviet security 
requirements, moreover, it would increase the security of the Soviet Union's 
western frontiers.!"
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Mary AaMor does not like the expression "neutrality", because it 
"may, in fact, presuppose the continuation of the blocs". She prefers to use 
the term "non-alignment" which, however, would not mean: "between 
the blocs", but "beyond the blocs". "A policy of non-alignment — she 
writes — is not simply a policy of opting out. I t  is a policy positively aimed 
at overcoming East-West confrontation and hence, at phasing out the mili­
tary blocs."3"
However, in contrast to the earlier quoted and a number of other au­
thors, whom I did not quote on this occasion, Kaldor sees the situation in a 
much more realistic manner. Although she criticised the blocs in many 
respects, and for example she considers a reason lor the deterioration of 
detente "the need to exaggerate an external threat to maintain bloc cohe­
sion", she writes the following with regard to the alliance: if some
countries would start to leave NATO "their departure could help to dimi­
nish the confrontation between East and West by increasing the political 
space between the blocs. But it could also have the opposite effect. If other 
NATO countries, particularly West Germany, were to increase their own 
armaments and play a more dominant role as a result, tension within and 
between the blocs could be greatly increased."2'
I believe that similar dangers are also perceived on the Eastern side. 
I t  has to be seen clearly that although neutrality, non-alignment is consi­
dered a very positive term in East European political thinking, this is only 
in connection with the neutral and non-aligned countries. With regard to 
the East European countries, these terms were compromised in the past 
decades, particularly through the 1956 Hungarian events. We may remem­
ber that during the Hungarian upheaval, those who unambiguously strived 
for the liquidation of the socialist system, wrote neutrality as their aim 
onto their flag and demanded the withdrawal of the country from the 
WTO. From that time onward, neutrality and the withdrawal from the 
military alliance became the synonyms of anti-socialism and the aspiration 
for the total change of the social-political system. Consequently, if as a pos­
sible result of alternative security concepts elaborated in Western Europe, 
anybody points out the liquidation of the bloc system and the neutrali­
zation of the Centra! European countries or their turning into non-aligned 
states, they will be faced with certain and immediate complete refusal 
from the Eastern side. One might say that such a reaction is relying on 
incorrect premises and the purest and most innocent political intentions 
can also be emphasized — nevertheless, the social fact will not change and 
goodwill will have no credibility.
If I correctly interpret the aim of the Western European concepts con­
cerning alternative security and within this, defensive defence, they were 
primarily invented to lessen the threat perceptions of the Eastern Euro­
pean countries. These conceptions should be advocated in the future in a 
manner that the threat perceptions should not increase. Mary Kaldor is 
correct in connection with the other alliance when she says that "if [the 
above mentioned] countries were to remain in NATO and to join with 
likeminded political forces in Western Europe and the United States to
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reorientate NATO strategy toward a defensive eonvetiona) posture, these 
actions cou!d wed have a more profound infiuence in diminishing tensions 
in Europe and making possibie the ultimate elimination of the b locs."2- 
In other words, not the formal structures should be first changed, because 
the military alliances are not the reasons, but the consequences of the split 
in the world and of the basic contradictions of interests existing in countries 
with o p t i n g  social systems. Let us get closer to the diminishing of the 
number of contradictions, let us mutually reduce the threat perceptions of 
the other party, let us multiply the means of mutual confidence building, 
let us extend all-European cooperation and we have already made conside­
rable progress in improving the quality of life in every country of the con­
tinent.
ANNEX
The four zones of defensive defense
1. "Efrc&c/t'. Very effective sensors, and weapons representing an enormous concent­
ration of file power, including anti-tank missiles, „intelligent mines" and helicopter mines 
against low flying attacking targets wotdd be deployed in a zone of 5 km depth. No troops 
would be stationed at all in this zone. The mentioned weapons wotdd be completely auto­
matic or remote controlled. Because of their great fire power and precision guidance, they 
would be able to wear down it significant part of the enemy's attacking forces.
2. "/iooAt-zone". In this 25 — 50 km zone, the attacking forces would be under enormous 
fire from well hidden guns and rocket launchers; a large number of guided anti-tank missiles 
would be launched, as well as autonomous manoeuvred mines, which ate able to reconnoitre 
and hit the penetrating armoured vehicles, while high precision anti-aii craft missiles wotdd be 
launched against the attacking fighter bombers. The difference compared to the previous 
zone is that soldiers would be stationed hete, however, not more than 3 — 4 persons pet- 
square kilometre. They wotdd always stay in the same area and wotdd know every bush in 
the district. These small units would dig themselves in, not providing any target, at the same 
time they wotdd be able to survey the area and control the turns they handle. Electronic 
sensors densely deployed in the first two zones wotdd provide precise information on everv 
move of the enemy, and the information received would be analyzed by high capacity com­
puters. They would also use optical instruments to sense the approaching vehicles. However, 
the guns and the launching equipment of the missiles would be deployed further from the 
units to prevent the attacking tanks from discovering their entrenchments in the moment 
of launching. Reliable contact wotdd be set up between the units, which would accurately 
operate even in the fiercest period of the attack. 1'or this end, underground optical fibre 
cables would be laid, since radio communication could easily be disrupted by the enemy or by 
the exchange of fire. According to these presumptions, even a very concentrated attack of 
heavy armoured forces, with considerable fire power, wotdd bteak down, after having gone 
through 10 — 15 km in such an environment, and would lose 25 — 30% of its forces.
3. "dfanoeMtve-zone". Mobile armoured units would be stationed in this zone — of 
not precisely defined depth -  which would bo able to counter-attack the hostile forces, that 
in some way broke through the previous two zones. These units would in fact be an "internal 
rapid deployment force" that would be able to teach the endangered points in a short time 
and destroy the invaders. However, at the emergence of the political crisis preceding the 
armed confrontation, they would immediately leave their districts and would be located 
in a decentralized patter n in order trot to become the targets of the short or medium-range 
missiles of the enemy.
4. "Rear de/ence zone". This would include the r est of the defending country's territory. 
Mobile defence units would be set up irr this zorre, which in the case of necessity could combat 
the air land operations and prevent sabotage planned by the enemy. In addition, further
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units wouid be stationed here, which could provide efficient logistic support to the troops 
fighting in the other zones or could provide supplies.
Offensive weapons and units would only be stat ioned in one of the four zones, namely, 
in the third one. They would primarily be necessary to drive out the invaders from the occu­
pied territor ies. The artillery alone would hardly be suitable for this. It is important for the 
defending party to have an option for counter-offence if the sit nation requires it. According 
to one of the author s, these weapons still exist and there is no opportunity to abolish them 
from one day to the other. However, as the time passes, some of them become outdated and 
their replacement will not be absolutely necessary.
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